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ABSTRACT 
The paper describes agricultural policies in Africa and 
seeks to account for them. 
Agricultural policy is defined as that set of decisions and 
choices by governments which influence the prices farmers face in the 
markets which determine the real value of their incomes. These include 
the markets for the commodities produced by farmers, the goods which 
they employ in farming, and the goods which they buy from urban industry. 
The pattern of government intervention is highly adverse to 
the interests of most farmers. Governments lower the prices of farm 
products and adopt policies which raise the prices of commodities pro­
duced by urban industry. While they tend to subsidize the prices of farm 
inputs, the benefits of this policy are consumed by the privileged few. 
The paper explores three explanations for the pattern of public 
policy. One treats the state as an agency for maximizing the welfare 
of society and sees policy choices as decisions made out of a regard for 
what is socially best. The second treats the government as an agency 
which responds to private interests and regards public policy as an out­
come of lobbying efforts by groups seeking favorable decisions by govern­
ments. The third treats the government as an agency which seeks to 
retain political power and interprets policy as an instrument utilized 
by those who seek to control the behavior of their populations. 
Each approach is shown to explain some but not all aspects 
of government policies toward farming in Africa. And of the three, 
the first is shown to be least satisfactory. 
INTRODUCTION 
In no other field of economics is government intervention so 
freely prescribed as in the field of development economics. And y et, 
speaking from the vantage point of political science; few fields in 
economics offer less insight into politics. Indeed, with but a few 
exceptions, development economists appear self-consciously to forswear 
entering the political thicket. Their professional interests, it 
would seem, require that they avoid explicit political analysis. They 
instead leave the political analysis of development problems to their 
colleagues in economic history or to informal discussions where the 
pathologies of governments are recounted with amused incredulity. 
This paper seeks to span a portion of the gap between 
political science and economics by examining a case study of market 
intervention in the developing areas. It focuses on the nature and 
form of government intervention in agricultural markets in Africa. It 
begins with an overview of agricultural policy in Africa. And it then 
seeks to explain the characteristic patterns which are observed. 
PATTERNS OF INTERVENTION: AN OVERVIEW 
For purposes of this analysis, we define agricultural policy 
as that set of decisions and actions by governments which influence 
the incomes of rural producers by attempting to alter the prices they 
confront in major markets. Farmers derive their revenues from the 
sales they make in the markets for agricultural products. Their 
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profits are a function of these revenues but also of the costs 
incurred in a second major market: the market for factors of 
production. And the real value of these profits, and thus the real 
value of their incomes, is determined by the prices which they must 
pay in a last major market: the market for consumer items and, in 
particular, the market for goods manufactured in the city. The 
analysis of agricultural policy, then, involves an examination of the 
nature and form of government intervention in the markets for 
agricultural commodities, for inputs into farming, and for the goods 
which farmers buy from the urban-industrial sector. 
A review of agricultural policies in tropical Africa suggests 
that they conform to a pattern common to that in most developing 
areas. Governments intervene so as to depress the prices of 
agricultural products. They intervene so as to increase the prices 
which must be paid for manufactured items. And while they subsidize 
the costs of farm inputs -- fertilizers, machinery, capital, land, and 
so on -- these subsidies tend to go to a small number of large-scale 
farmers. Agricultural policies tend to b e adverse to the economic 
interests of most farmers. 
Markets For Products 
With some violence to the facts, the marketed products of 
African farmers can be classified into two kinds: cash crops largely 
destined for export and food crops destined for domestic consumption. 
In the case of both products, governments adopt policies which attempt 
to depress prices. 
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Cash Crops. Cash crops include the beverage crops: coffee, 
tea and cocoa. They include crops which yield vegetable oil s :  palm 
oil, palm kernel oil, cotton seeds and groundnut s. They also include 
such fibres as sisal and cotton. 
Most government s in Africa maintain publicly sanctioned 
monopsonies for the �urchase and marketing of these crops. While the
existence of international boundar ies and the frequent absence of 
border controls allow some farmer s to evade the exactions of their own 
national agency, the best most farmers can often do is to sell their 
crops to the monopsony run by an adj acent government. By one 
estimate, at the t ime of independence, government marketing agencies 
handled 90 percent of the export s  of palm kernels, � percent of the 
exports of coffee, 6 5  percent of the exports of tea, and 60 percent of 
the exports of raw cotton (Temu, p. 12). 
Most African governments inherited these monopsonistic 
marketing structures from their colonial predecessors. The historical 
origins of these agencies differ in important respects. Some were set 
up by the producers themselves; this was most frequently the case in 
East, Central and Southern Africa. Others were erected by the 
colonial governments in league with private trading firms; this 
pattern tended to prevail in Western Africa. Whatever their origin, 
however, the agencies have increasingly been employed by the 
governments of Africa to levy revenues and foreign exchange from the 
producers of cash crops. 
The governments use the monopsonistic power of the marketing 
agencies to set a domestic price. They then sell the crop on the 
world market at the prevail ing international price. The difference 
between the two prices al lows the accumulation of a trading surplus. 
This surplus represents a tax on the agricultural producers. 1 
I have attempted to collect data on the level of the financial 
burden placed on the producers of export crops by the dual-pr ice 
policy of the public marketing agencies (see Appendix). In most cases 
the data represent the prices offered in the domestic market expressed 
as a percent of the pr ice f. o. b. at the nearest major port. In most 
cases, they represent the percent of the income generated by the sale 
of the crop in the international market which is actually secured by 
the producer s. In either case, the table document s that the producers 
almost invariably received a pr ice which lay below the world market 
price. In most instances, they obtained less than two-thirds the 
potential sales realization. And, in many cases, they received less 
than one half. 
While it is the generally draconian nature of the dual price 
policy which I wish to emphasize, it is useful and important to point 
out as well variations within this general trend. The data is thin 
and statements concerning variations must at this point remain 
conj ectural. I offer them merely as hypotheses. 
One source of variation appears to derive from the historical 
origins of the marketing systems. In East Africa, where they were 
originally formed by the producers themselves in efforts to defend 
their economic interests, the agencies have tended to impose lower 
levels of taxat ion ; in West Africa, where the agencies were formed by 
government and trading interests, they have tended to impose more 
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adverse price levels. 
A second source of variation is the nature of the rival 
claimants for resources from agriculture. One claimant, of cour se, is 
the producer. Where production is in the hand of large-scale 
producers, it would then appear that government s tend to confer more 
favorable prices. In Kenya, for example, estate producers of coffee 
receive no less than 90 percent of the world market price for their 
crop, whereas small holders receive no more than 66 percent. In 
Ghana, rice product ion takes place on large-scale mechanized farms; 
producers receive a price in excess of the international price. Cocoa 
production, by contrast, takes place on small-scale peasant holdings; 
it is severely taxed. 
Another claimant is the government. Faced by the imperative 
of securing revenues, governments impose taxes; and the greater their 
access to non-agricultural sources of revenue, then, all else 
remaining equal, the lower the taxes on farmers. In nations with 
major extractive industries which can produce revenues and foreign 
exchange, we should thus expect to see lower levels of taxat ion. 
Exemplifying this is the case of Nigeria; when the oil industry in 
Nigeria came "on line" in the mid-l 970s, the level of domestic prices 
for agricultural crops rose by comparison with those in the 
international market. 
A last major claimant is the local processing industry which 
employs cash crops as raw materials. Governments promote the 
formation of such industries as a way of incr easing the shar e of 
"value added" captured by the domestic economy. To secure investments 
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in these industries, the governments offer prospects of low prices for 
agricultural products. The consequence is the depression of crop 
prices. For example, while the government of Nigeria altered it s 
pricing policy, it nonetheless failed to confer incr eases in the level 
of cotton prices and virtually banned the export of groundnuts, thus 
keeping domestic prices well below world market prices. A major 
reason for these act ions was the desire to protect the interests of 
the local textile and oil-extracting industries which sought low 
prices for their raw materials (see African Business, May 197 9). 2 
Variations in the historical origins of government 
intervention, in the structure of agricultural production, in the 
nature of revenue imperative faced by governments, and in the strength 
of compet ing interests within the agricultural industry � all these 
influence the pricing policies of governments. Nonetheless, what 
should be emphasized is that the resultant variations in pricing 
policy take place within what from the farmers' point of view are 
highly disadvantageous limits. Overwhelmingly, government policy 
favor s low prices for agricultural products. 
The monopsonistic sett ing of prices is one form of 
intervention in the market for cash crops. Another is the maintenance 
of an overvalued currency. It is the consensus of almost everyone who 
studies trade policy in Africa that most governments maintain 
dis equilibrium rates of exchange. By overvaluing their currencies, 
they reduce the purchasing power of those who sell in foreign markets 
and increase the purchasing power of those who import from them. The 
effect, of course, is to transfer income from the producers of cash 
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crops to others: the nascent industries who import capital equipment 
from abroad and those consumers whose incomes and tastes lead them to 
make major foreign purchases. 
Food Crops. Governments in Africa not only intervene to 
depress the price of cash crops; they also intervene in attempts to 
secure low-priced food. 
In part, they intervene by attempting directly to manipulate 
the price of food products. In their commercial policies, for 
example, they tend to guarantee the consumer the minimum of the world 
or domestic price; the obj ect of this policy is to ensure that the 
consumer pays whichever. is lower. Overvaluation of the domestic 
currency cheapens the price of foreign foodstuffs; and governments 
tend not to offer tariff protection to domestic producers so as to 
offset the effect of overvaluation. As a result, the lower world 
price tends to prevail on the urban markets; Africa has become a major 
importer of food. Moreover, when the world price lies above the 
domestic price, governments often ban the export of food items. 
Exports of meat from the Sudan and Kenya, of tea and dairy products 
from Kenya, and of maize from Zambia have, for example, been 
terminated from time to time to prevent domestic shortages. The 
effect, of course, is to prevent the domestic price from rising to the 
world price, thus preserving the lower local price for the domestic 
consumer. 
Governments also attempt directly to administer prices in food 
markets. Many attempt to establish price controls ; the floggings of 
persons failing to abide by government prices under Rawling' s regime 
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in Ghana is but a vivid, if pathological, illustration of a common 
policy commitment. Some governments attempt to secure low cost food 
through the establishment of monopsonistic marketing channel s. In 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, and throughout the Sahel ian countries, 
public agencies are empowered to operate as the sole legal purchasers 
of staple food crops. Through elaborate controls over the movement, 
storage and marketing of the crops, they seek to depress the prices 
paid to farmers and thereby secure low cost food. 3 Governments also
seek low food prices through the conferral of subsidies; government 
subventions to millers, for example, help to keep down the pr ice of 
bread in Nigeria, Zambia, and Tanzania. 
Within these general trends, there are again important sources 
of variation. The degree to which governments attempt to depress the 
price of food crops in order to lower prices to the urban consumer is 
a function of their ability to transfer the costs- to other segments of 
the population. When there is a major extractive industry, for 
example, governments can more easily undertake such subsidies. This 
was the case in Zambia, where copper revenues were used to subsidize 
millers who in turn were required to market flour at low official 
prices; the fall of copper prices in the 1970s lead to a cutback in 
the subsidies and a rise of urban food prices. In other cases, it is 
export agricultur e that assumes the fiscal burden; the takeover of the 
Sierra Leone Rice Corporation, with its heavy commitments to the 
importation and subsidization of the domestic price of rice, by the 
Sierra Leone Marketing Board, which raises its revenues from the 
export of cash crops, represents a direct effort to employ resources 
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levied from the producers of export crops to subsidize the urban 
consumer of food crops. In other cases, foreign donors pick up the 
bill; in the later 1 970s, this pattern prevailed throughout the Sahel. 
Elsewhere, governments lack sources of revenues by which to finance 
low-cost urban food and they are far less able to employ subsidies as 
a policy instrument. 
Lastly, it should be noted that different crops offer 
different potentials for the use of government marketing agencies as a 
means of establishing lower product prices. In particular, it is 
obvious that attempts directly to manage the marketing of foodstuffs 
in order to reduce prices are far less effective than government 
attempts to manage the export of cash crops. In countries with food 
crop monopsonies, as much as 90 percent of the crop, by some 
estimates, moves outside of marketing channels. Several major 
variables appear to determine the relative efficacy of this policy 
instrument. The number of consumers of cash crops is limited : they 
must have access to foreign markets or to expensive processing 
equipment. Moreover, the crops must move through wel l-def ined spatial 
locations : ports and harbors, for example. Lastly, they are often 
grown in ecologically specialized zones. Food crops, by contrast, can 
be grown by al l farmers. They need not move through particular sites. 
And they place no particular restrictions on consumer s; they can be 
bought and processed by almost anyone. As a consequence of these 
characteristics, it is simply far easier for governments to police and 
control the marketing of cash crops and thereby impose lower product 
prices. 
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Markets for Inputs 
Through a variety of means, then, governments attempt directly 
to depress the price of goods produced by farmers. Particularly in 
the case of food crops, however, the results are unsatisfactory. The 
nature of the market in these crops make it easy for attempts at 
regulation to be evaded. The use of commercial policy, moreover, runs 
counter to the need to conserve and to earn foreign exchange. 
Governments therefore try other methods. Rather than directly 
manipulating prices, they manipulate supplies and thereby seek to 
lower prices. 
One way is by directly entering food production. In many of 
the nations of Africa, government agencies produce food. In some 
countries, special units of the Ministry of Agriculture engage in food 
production. In many, irrigation authorities grow and market food. In 
others, units of the governing pol itical party or its youth brigades 
staff government farms. In still other s, efforts are lodged in 
special public agencies : those in charge of mechanization, water 
management, river basin development, or the promotion of designated 
crops. In at least one case, the department of prisons is used to 
grow food. African governments have thus become major food producer s. 
In addition to themselves growing food, governments attempt to 
promote private production. They do so not by offering higher prices 
for products but rather by attempting to lower the costs of 
production. While taxing farmers in the market for products, they 
subsidize them in the market for farm inputs. 
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Attempts to lower input prices take various forms. 
Governments provide subsidies for seeds and fertilizers,  the level of 
the last running from 30 to Ill percent (30 percent in Kenya and Ill 
percent in Nigeria). They provide tractor hire services at subsidized 
rates , up to SO percent of the real costs in Ghana in the mid-1 970s 
(Stryker , Kline et al. ). They provide loans at subsidized rates of 
interest for the purchase and rental of inputs. Aud they provide 
highly favorable tax treatment for major investors in commercial 
farming ventures (see, for example, Ekhomu). Moreover , through their 
power over property rights ,  African governments have released 
increased amounts of land and water to commercial farmers at costs 
that lie below the value they would generate in alternative uses. The 
diversion of land to large-scale farmers and of water to private 
tenants on government irrigation schemes,  without the payment of 
compensation to those who employed these resources in subsistence 
farming , pastoral production, f ishing or other ventur es represents the 
conferring of a subsidy upon the commercial farmer -- and one that is 
paid by the expense of the small-scale, traditional producer. This 
process has been documented in Northern Ghana (United States Agency in 
International Development, 1 975;  West Africa, April 3 ,  1 97 8) ;  Nigeria 
(Ekhomu; Girdner and Olorunsula); Kenya (Nj onjo); Ethiopia (Cohen and 
Weintraub) and S enegal (Cruise O'Brien). It was ,  of course, common in 
settler Africa as well. 
In the case of land and water , then, a major effect of 
government intervention in the market for inputs is to augment the 
fortunes of large-scale farmers at the expense of small-scale farmers. 
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To some degree, this is true of programs in support of chemical and 
mechanized inputs as well. 4 Even where there is no direct 
redistribution, however , it is clear that government programs which 
seek to increase food production by reducing the costs of farming 
reach but a small segment of the farming population: the large 
farmers. In part, this is by plan: the programs are aimed at the 
"progressive farmers" who will ''make best IJ.!le of them. " In part, it 
is because the large farmers share a common social background with 
tho se who staff the public services ; the public servants therefore aim 
their programs and services at those with whom they feel they can work 
most congenially and productively (see Leonard and Van Velsen). And, 
in part, it is because the favor ing of the large farmer is politically 
productive. I will elaborate this argument below. 
Markets for Manufactured Items 
While subsidizing the cost of farm inputs,  most African 
governments pursue policies designed to lower the price of 
agricultural products. By contrast, in their policies toward industry 
and manufacturing , they follow policies whose effect is to raise the 
price of goods. 
In promoting industrial development, governments adopt 
commercial policies which shelter local industries from foreign 
competition. To some degree, they impose tar iff barriers between the 
local and international markets. To an even greater extent, they 
employ quantitative restrictions. Quotas , import licenses , and 
permits to acquire and use foreign exchange: all are employed to 
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conserve foreign exchange on the one hand while, on the other, 
protecting the domestic market for local industries. In connection 
with the maintenance of overvalued currencies , the trade barriers 
create incentives for investors to import capital equipment from 
abroad and to manufacture goods domestically which formerly had been 
imported from abroad (Stryker ; Pearson et al. ; ILO ; and IBRD , 1975 and 
197 8). 
Not only do goverIU11ent policies shelter industries from low 
cost foreign competition; they shelter them from domestic competition 
as well. In part, protection from domestic competition is a by­
product of protection from foreign competition. The policy of 
al locating licenses to import in conformity with historic market 
shares provides an example of such a measure. The limitation of 
competition results from other policies as well. In exchange for 
commitments to invest, goverIU11ents guarantee periods of freedom from 
competition. Moreover , goverIUllents tend to favor large proj ects ; 
seeking infusions of scarce capital, they tend to back those proposals 
which promise the largest capital investments. Given the S111all 
markets typical of most African nations , the result is that investors 
create plants whose output represent a very large fraction of the 
domestic market ; a 8111811 number of firms thus come to dominate the 
industry. Lastly, particularly where state enterprises are concerned , 
goverIU11ents sometimes confer virtual monopoly rights upon particular 
enterprises. The consequence of all these measures is to shelter 
industries from domestic competition. 
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One result is that inefficient firms survive. Estimates of 
the use of industrial capacity range as low as one-fifth the single 
shift capacity of installed plant (state enterprises in Ghana in 1 966; 
Killick p. 171). Another consequence is that prices rise. Protected 
from foreign competition and operating in ol igopolistic or 
monopolistic settings, firms are able to charge prices which enable 
them to survive despite operating at very high levels of cost. 
GOVERNMENTS AS PURPOS IVE ACTORS 
We have def ined agricultural policies as those decis ions and 
actions by goverIIIllents that attempt to alter prices in markets which 
determine the real incomes of farmers. GoverIIIllents intervene in the 
market for products in an effort to lower prices. They adopt policies 
which tend to raise the price of the goods which farmers buy. And 
while they attempt to lower the costs of farm inputs,  the benefits of 
this policy are experienced by very few farmers. Agricultural 
policies in Africa thus tend to be adverse to the interests of most 
producers. 
Studies in other areas suggest that this configuration of 
pricing decisions is common in the developing nations. (Kr ishna ; 
United States GoverIU11ent Accounting Office ; Gotsch and Brown ;  Griffin; 
Lipton. ) Indeed, it is argued by some that the principal problems 
bedeviling agriculture in the developing areas originate from bad 
public policies. In the words of S chultz , given the right incentives , 
farmers in the developing world would "turn sand into gold" (S chultz , 
197 5, p • .  5). Distortions introduced into agricultural markets by 
goverIU11ents,  he contends ,  furnish the most important reasons for their 
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failure t o  do s o  (Schultz,  1 97 8). While S chultz' s position i s  perhaps 
an extreme one, it nonetheless under scores the importance of 
understanding why third world governments select the characteristic 
pattern of agricultural policies. In the sections which remain, I 
will advance several explanations for their choices. 
I begin with an account that rests on the proposition that 
government s are agencies whose task is to secure the best interests of 
their societies. According to this position, policy choices are 
derived from a consideration of the national welfare. The choices of 
third world governments ,  in particular , reflect a determination to 
secure development ; and, in the context of how this is understood, 
development implies supplanting agriculture with industry. 
Such an explanation has much to recounnend it. For virtually 
all the government s of Africa seek industrial development. Most seek 
to create the social and economic infrastructure necessary for 
industrial growth and many are colDlllitted to the completion of major 
industrial and manufacturing proj ects. To fulfill their plans , 
governments need revenues ; they also need foreign exchange. In most 
of the African nations , agriculture represents the single largest 
sector in the domestic economy ; and in many it represents the 
principal source of foreign exchange. It is therefore natural that in 
seeking to fulfill their obj ectives for their societies, the 
government s of Africa should intervene in markets in an effort to set 
prices in a way that transfers resources from agriculture to the 
"industrializing" sectors of the economy: the state itself and the 
urban industrial and manufacturing firms. 
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An explanation based on the development obj ectives of African 
regimes is thus consistent with the choices made in the markets for 
export goods. It is also consistent with other well-known facts. The 
policy choices which have been made are,  for example, in keeping with 
the prescriptions propounded in leading development theories. 
According to these theories, to secure higher levels of per capita 
income, nations should move from the production of primary products to 
the production of manufactured goods. S avings take place out of the 
profits of industry and not out of the earnings of farmers. Resources 
should therefore be levied from agriculture and channeled into 
industrial development. And agriculture in the developing areas,  it 
is held, can surrender revenues without significant declines in 
production. These were,  and remain today, critical assertions in 
development doctrine. Many policymakers in Africa were trained under 
development specialists ;  and important advocates of these arguments 
served as consultants to the development ministries of the new African 
states. It is therefore credible to account for the policy choices 
made by African governments � ones which systematically bias the 
structure of prices against agriculture and in favor of industry � as 
choices made in accordance with ·prescriptions of how best to secure 
the welfare of people in poor societies. The states can thus be 
viewed as agencies for maximizing the social welfare and their 
policies as choices made in conformity with notions as to what is 
socially best. 
Such an approach ultimately proves unsatisfactory, however, 
and for several reasons. First of all, it is incomplete. For , to 
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secure social obj ectives , governments can choose among a variety of 
instruments. And the underlying objectives of a program often do not 
resolve which technique is chosen to secure its implementation. 
For example, an important objective of African governments is 
to increase food supplies. To secure greater supplies , they could 
off er higher prices for food or invest the same amount of resources in 
food production projects. There is every reason to believe that the 
former is a more efficient way of secur ing the objective. But 
governments in Africa systematically prefer project based policies to 
price based policies. 
To strengthen the incentives for food production, African 
governments can increase the price of farm products or subsidize the 
costs of farm implements. Either would result in higher prof its for 
producers. But governments prefer the latter policy. 
To increase output, African governments finance production 
programs. But given the level of resources devoted to these programs , 
they often create too many projects ; the programs then fail because 
resources have been spread too thin. Such behavior is nonsensical , 
given the social objectives of the program. 
To take a last example : In the face of shortages, governments 
can either allow prices to rise or they can maintain lower prices 
while impos ing quotas. In a variety of markets of significance to 
agricultural producers ,  African governments chose to ration. They 
exhibit a systematic preference for the use of this technique -- a 
preference that can not be accounted for in terms of their development 
objectives. 
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A major problem with an approach which tries t o  explain 
agricultural policies in terms of the social objectives of 
governments, then, is that the obj ectives rarely determine the 
particular form which the policies assume. There is a second major 
difficulty. Given the obj ectives underlying agricultural policies , 
the policy choices are often self-defeating. Nonetheless,  they are 
made and sustained by governments. 
To secure cheaper food , for example, governments lower prices 
to producers ;  but this only creates shortages which lead to higher 
food prices. To increase resources with which to f inance programs of 
development, governments increase agricultural taxes ; but this leads 
to declines in production and to shortfalls in public finances and 
foreign exchange. The policy instruments chosen are thus inconsistent 
with their stated objectives. One possible conclusion is that the 
obj ectives do not explain the policies. Another is that the 
obj ectives lead to choices of policies which hindsight reveals to be 
inappropriate;  and what is then needed is an approach that helps to 
explain why policy choices remain stable despite the fact that they 
generate adverse consequences. 
There is a last and more general problem. The approach rests 
on the assumption that the state seeks to maximize the social welfare 
of its people ; the welfare-maximizing program for poor societies , it 
is held, is one of industrialization. Even accepting this to be true , 
one can still question whether this objective accounts for the choice 
of policies. For it can strongly be argued that rather than promoting 
industr ialization, these policies have in fact retarded it. 
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Moreoever, it can strongly be argued that even were they promoting 
industrialization, the policies do so at the cost of enormous 
inefficiencies and that they are therefore not consistent with welfare 
maximization. The inefficiencies are indeed major; they arise in the 
form of welfare losses due to distortions in prices and to the 
wholesale creation of non-competitive rents. The prevalence and 
pervasiveness of such inefficiencies thus calls into question the 
validity of this form of analysis. 
GOVERNMENTS AS RESPONDENTS TO POLITICAL DEMANDS 
The first approach thus views the state as an agency for 
attaining social purposes and explains agricultural policies as 
choices made in an effort to secure the public welfare. An 
alternative approach would view public policy as the outcome of 
political pressures exerted by members of society who seek the 
satisfaction of their private interests from political action. 
Particularly with respect to food crops, this approach is useful in 
explaining the configuration of relative prices which governments seek 
to attain. As we have seen, governments seek to impose low prices for 
food; they also intervene in ways that increase the price of 
manufactured items. This behavior is consistent with what would 
result from a political process that involves lobbying to influence 
the setting of relative prices. 
This argument is based on several key assumptions. One is 
that people specialize in production but "generalize" in consumption, 
i.e., while they derive the vast bulk of their incomes from the 
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production of a particular good, they spend their incomes widely on a 
variety of commodities, devoting only a portion to the consumption of 
each. For purposes of exposition, call the percentage of income which 
the representative consumer spends on "i" Cl. • •  
l. 
Each good can then be 
characterized by its Cl. - weight. Another assumption is that 
specialization has proceeded much further in the industrial and 
manufacturing sectors than it has in agriculture. In the industrial 
sector, firms produce such items as flashlights batteries, bicycle 
tires, or enamel ware. In agriculture, by contrast, firms tend to 
produce a wide range of commodities. Farmers tend to grow the full 
range of food crops necessary for their own subsistence and to market 
what they do not consume; they thus produce a fairly undifferentiated 
product which we will call "food." A third assumption is that people 
are poor. As a consequence, they tend to spend a high proportion of 
their incomes on food -- in the range of 60 percent in Africa, 
according to most surveys (see Kaneda and Johnston). Food, in other 
words, has a very high Cl. - weight. The last assumption is that 
governments have policy instruments at their command � tariffs, price 
controls, licensing powers, etc. by which to influence prices and 
that in doing so they respond to numbers, in the sense that the 
broader the coalition that demands price intervention, the larger the 
increase which the government will confer. 
Making these (and other) assumptions, it can be shown that if 
people seek to maximize the value of their real incomes in this simply 
styled political economy, then an equilibrium coalition will form. 
The coalition will contain some but not all members of the society. 
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In particular, it will contain those industries which produce goods 
with small o. - weights. The greater the o. - weight of a commodity, 
the less the likelihood that the makers of the commodity will be a 
member of the coalition. Agriculture, in short, is likely to fall 
outside of the coalition and to have prices set against it in a way 
that redistributes income to the coalition members (see Bates and 
Rogerson). 
The process that drives this result can be easily portrayed. 
If a person derives his/her income from the making of a good, then 
that person will favor higher prices for that good; specializing in 
production and generalizing in consumption, the benefits of the price 
rise on his/her income will more than offset the losses sustained from 
having to pay higher prices for the commodity. If governments respond 
more favorably to demands from groups than to demands from single 
industries, then there are benefits to be derived from forming 
coalitions. And people who make goods with small o. - weights will 
secure them. For the gains in income resulting from the increased 
price of the goods they make will more than offset the losses that 
result from the higher prices they now have to pay for their own goods 
and for the goods of their coalitional partners; they spend but a 
small portion of their income on these commodities. In the search for 
partners with whom to combine in petitions for price rises, however, 
food producers are relatively unattractive partners. For consumers 
spend a high proportion of their incomes on food; an increase in food 
prices has a larger effect on real incomes than would a similar 
increase in the price of commodities which possess smaller o. -
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weights. In the search for partners with whom to join in price 
setting coalitions, then, persons do better combining with the makers 
of other commodities. Food producers therefore find themselves 
outside of the policymaking, price setting coalition. 5 
This model strongly underscores the importance of several 
further "facts" which are known to be true. General strikes are 
fairly common in Africa -- something which has surprised most 
scholars, given social theory 's tendency to relate the militancy of 
labor to the level of "maturity" of the industrial sector. Protests 
by one group are often supported by actions on the part of others. 
This is in keeping with our model. Moreover, on the one hand, workers 
demand policies that increase prices -- e. g. , by shelterig their 
industries from foreign competition and on the other demand 
policies that lower prices -- e. g. , by intervening in the markets for 
food. This also is in keeping with our model. Thirdly, in Africa, 
governments are besieged by urban interests concerned with the real 
value of their incomes. The colonial powers were driven from West 
Africa by nationalist movements organized in large part around anti­
inflation campaigns. And the Tolbert regime in Liberia was recently 
overthrown in large part as a consequence of increasing the price of 
rice. Sadat nearly fell following the removal of subsidies to urban 
consumers. Some of the strongest challengers to Kaunda in Zambia and 
Mei in Kenya have come after precipitate rises in the cost of food in 
urban market centers. Policy in agriculture is formulated in an 
effort to seek means of appeasing urban forces concerned with 
protecting the real value of their incomes. This is historically 
true. And, once again, it is what we should expect, given the 
dynamics captured in the model. 
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It should be noted that the approach accounts not only for the 
disadvantaged position of agriculture in the developing countries but 
also for the changing position of agriculture at higher levels of 
development. One index of development is higher per capita income; by 
Engel's law, with higher incomes, the percent of incomes spent on food 
declines. Moreover, with development, specialization increases; farms 
no longer produce food for subsistence purposes, but rather specialize 
in the production of particular crops. The results of these 
alterations in consumption and production is to lower the ll - weight 
of farm products. Producers of food now become viable members of 
policymaking coalitions. Indeed, with development, agriculture tends 
to evolve from an industry which is excluded from price setting 
coalitions to one that is a member of them. In developed countries, 
government induced price distortions tend to favor farmers (see 
Hayami; Schultz 1 97 8). 
There is, of course, another set of factors at work. A price 
in a market is a public good. If one producer secures a government 
policy which sets a favorable price, all other producers can enjoy the 
benefits of that policy for free. It is therefore difficult to 
organize collective action in support of price setting measures. The 
magnitude of the difficulties varies, however, with the structure of 
the industry . And structural factors tend to conspire against the 
political efficacy of agriculture. 
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Where there is but one producer, then, of course, there is no 
incentive to free ride. And where there are but a few producers, and 
where each producer markets a fairly high proportion of the industry's 
output, then the private returns to each producer from an increase in 
price may more than offset the costs of lobbying. Again, the 
incentives to free ride are weakened. But where there are numerous 
producers, each generating but a small proportion of the total output, 
then the incentives for collective action are weak. The benefits of a 
change in price to each producer are small; and, lacking any easy 
means to apportion the costs of a lobbying effort, the benefits may be 
exceeded by the costs of providing the change in pricing policy. As 
in any case each producer would do best reaping the benefits of the 
change for free, the incentives not to contribute to the costs of 
lobbying are strong. 
In addition, industries with a large number of small firms are 
simply very costly to organize. This is especially true where the 
firms are widely scattered. The costs of communicating and 
coordinating rise with the number of producers and their dispersion. 
Moreover, as the number of firms increases and the size of their 
output relative to total production of the industry declines, then the 
costs of policing price agreements,rise. An individual farmer, for 
example, could increase his profits by undercutting the market price 
and his behavior would have little impact on prevailing market prices. 
Were, however, a member of, say, the cement industry in Kenya to 
undercut prices in an effort to increase sales, its behavior would 
soon show up in the overall level of market prices. Publicly 
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sanctioned agreements in support of higher prices thus are more costly 
to organiz e, to police , and thus to sustain in relatively atomistic 
industries. 
The implications of this argument are clear. Differences in 
the structure of production between the agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors of Africa systematially favor lobyying efforts by 
manufacturing. In most nations and for most crops, production is 
undertaken by a multitude of small scale, village farmers. The 
farmers are widely dispersed. By contrast, as we have seen, 
government policy favors high levels of concentration in manufactur ing 
and industry ; and firms tend to be located in highly concentrated 
urban locations. For members of the agricultural industry , then, the 
characteristics of their industry is such that the incentives to 
organize to secure advantageous market prices are far weaker than for 
members of the manufacturing sector. 
In this section, we have examined the factors that underly the 
demands for government intervention to set prices in markets. We have 
seen how economic incentives can yield a pattern of demands that favor 
manufacturing over agriculture. And we have seen as well how factors 
that determine the level of politically effective demands� i. e. , 
demands that are championed by organized interests � reinforce this 
tendency. An approach that views agricultural policy not as a 
realization of social goals by a centralized planning agency but 
rather as an outcome of a competitive political process thus explains 
some of the characteristics of the policies which the alternative 
fails to account for: the use of "negative" pricing policies, for 
26 
example, and the use of policies which impose major efficiency losses. 
Nonetheless,  this analysis too is incomplete. While it 
accounts for the depres sion of the relative price of food products ,  it 
fails to account for the subsidization of input s ;  that agriculture is 
both subsidized and taxed remains unexplained. It also fails to 
explain why some farmers are privileged, even while the incomes of 
others are uniformly depres sed as a result of public policy Lastly, 
it fails to explain the strong preference of governments for project 
based strategies and why, when given a choice, governments appear to 
prefer to ration shortages rather than allocate goods through the 
market. To explain these features of agricultural policies in Afr ica, 
a third approach is needed: one that looks at agr icultural programs 
as part of a repertoire of devices employed by African governments in 
their efforts to secure political control over their populations and 
thus to remain in power. 
MARKET INTERVENTION AND POLITICAL CONTROL 
Governments in Africa, like governments everywhere, seek to 
retain political power. They shape and structure their pol icy 
programs so as to satisfy political claimants and nullify the 
political opposition. These tendencies have already been observed in 
the choices made with respect to agricultural prices: attempts to 
lower food prices are, of course,  efforts to appease organized urban 
interests. They can also be observed in other features of 
agricultural policy : the tendency to confer divisible as opposed to 
general benefits and to render the inefficiencies as sociated with 
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disequilibrium prices a basis for political organization. 
Divisible Benefits 
We have already seen that adopting policies in support of 
higher prices for agricultural commodities would be politically costly 
to African governments. What is important is that such a stance would 
generate few political benefits as well. For, as we have noted , a 
price in a market is a public good. From a political point of view, 
conferring higher prices therefore holds few attractions for 
politicians for the benefits of the measure can be enjoyed by 
opponents and supporters alike. The benefits can not be restricted 
exclusively to the faithful and withheld from the politically 
disloyal. Pricing policies ther efore can not be employed by 
politicans to organiz e political fol lowings. 
Project based policies, however , suffer less from this 
liabil ity. Officials can exercise discretion in locating project s ;  
they can also exercise discretion in staff ing them. Such discretion 
allows them to selectively bestow benefits upon those whose pol itical 
support they desire. 
The relative political utility of proj ects explains several 
otherwise puzzl ing features of agricultural programs. One is the 
tendency to construct too many projects, given the budgetary resources 
available. A reason for this proliferation is that governments often 
wish to ensur e that officials in each administrative district or 
electoral constituency have access to resources with which to secure a 
political backing (see, for example, Wells and Dadson). Another 
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tendency is to hire too great a staff or a staff that i s  technically 
untrained, thus undercutting the viability of the projects. A reason 
for this is that j obs on projects � and j obs in many of the 
bureaucracies involved with agricultural programs , for that matter 
-represent political plums,  ones given by those in charge of the 
programs to their political fo llowers. State farms in Ghana were 
staffed by the youth brigade of the ruling Convention Peoples' Party 
and the cooperative societies in Zambia were formed and operated by 
the local and constituency-level units of the governing party, to 
offer but two examples of the link between staffing and political 
organization. A last tendency is to have projects that are pr·ivately 
prof itable but socially wasteful. Again and again, from an economic 
point of view, agricultural projects fail ; they often fail to generate 
earnings that cover their costs or , when they do so,  they often fail 
to generate a rate of return comparable to that obtainable through 
alternative uses of government funds. Nonetheless,  public agencies 
revive and reimplement such proj ects. A major reason is that public 
officials are frequently less concerned with using public resources in 
a way that is economically efficient than they are with using them in 
a way that is politically expedient. If a project fails to generate 
an adequate return on the public investment, but nonetheless is 
privately rewarding for those who build it, provision it, staff it, or 
hold tenancies in it, then political officials may nonetheless support 
it. For it will serve as a source of rewards for their fol lowers and 
as an instrument for building a rural political constituency. 
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Divisibility and Divide and Rule 
We have seen that government policies are often aimed at 
establishing low prices for agricultural products. Particularly in 
the market for cash crops,  governments maintain monopsonistic agencies 
and use their market power to lower product prices. They therefore 
impose deprivations on all producers. What is interesting, however , 
is that they return a portion of the resources which they thus exact 
to selected members of the farm community. Some of the earnings taxed 
from farmers are returned in the form of subsidies for farm inputs and 
these are given to a privileged few. While imposing collective 
deprivations, governments thus confer selective benefits. The 
benefits serve as "side payment s":  they compensate selected members of 
the rural sector for the lo sses they sustain as a consequence of the 
government s' programs. They ther eby make it in the private interests 
of particular members of the rural sector to abide by policies which 
are harmful to rural dwellers as a whole. By so doing , they secure 
the defection of favored farmers from a potential rural opposition and 
their adherence to the governing coalition which implements 
agricultural programs which are harmful to the majority of producers. 
We have already noted that agricultural producers are both 
subsidized and taxed. What is of concern at this point is the use of 
subsidized programs for political purposes. In Northern Ghana in the 
late 1 970s,  for example, subsidized credit was given to large-scale ,  
mechanized producers who were close allies o f  the ruling military 
government. In Senegal ,  the rural base of the governing party is 
dominated by the Mouride s,  a religious sect that earns much of its 
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income from the production of groundnut s; its adherence to the 
government in power , and to the government' s pricing policies, is in 
large part secured by the conferral upon it s leaders of massive 
amounts of subsidized credit , land , machinery, and other farm input s 
(Cruise O'Brien). In Zambia, access to subsidized inputs could best 
be obtained by most rural dwel lers by membership in agricultural 
coooperative societies. The societies were, formed by local units of 
the governing party and are now dominated by them; access to inputs is 
therefore contingent upon political loyalty. The rural loans program, 
mor eover, was run and staffed at the local level by former party 
''militant s" who helped to insure that the "fruits of independence" 
were given to those who contributed to the cause of the party in 
power. In Ghana, to cite one last example, the collective resistance 
of cocoa producers to low cocoa prices in the 1 9 50s was broken in part 
by the "s ecret weapon" of the Convention Peoples' Party, the notorious 
United Ghana Farmers' Council. By distributing gammalin, cutlas ses 
and other farm inputs to those who would support the government and 
its policies ,  and by restricting access to credit to the political 
faithful,  the Farmers' Council helped to break the resistance of the 
farming population to the government and its agricultural programs 
(Ghana, 1956, 1967). 
It should be noted, incidently , that the bestowal of 
privileged access to farm inputs was a technique employed as well by 
the colonial government s. And the exchange of political loyalty for 
access to these inputs was widely recognized to be a part of the 
bargain. In Northern and Southern Rhodesia, for example, the colonial 
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governments used revenues secured by their monopsonistic maize 
marketing agency to subsidize the costs of input s which they then 
lavished upon a relatively small number of so-called "improved" or 
"progressive" farmers. The nationalist movements presciently labeled 
these farmers "stooges" of the colonial regimes. They saw that the 
apportionment of the input s had been employed to separate the 
interests of these privileged farmers from the interests of the mass 
of rural producers and to detach their pol itical loyalties from those 
of their fellow Africans. 
Conferring selective benefit s in the markets for farm input s 
on the one hand , while impo sing collective deprivations in the markets 
for products on the other , governments thereby secure the deference of 
a privileged few to programs which are harmful to the interests of 
most farmers. By politicizing their farm programs and making access 
to their benefits contingent upon political loyalty, the governments 
secure acquiescence to those in power and compliance with their 
policies. The political efficacy of these measures is underscored by 
the fact that they are targeted on the larger producers :  those who 
have the most to gain from a change in pricing pol icy and who might 
otherwise provide the "natural leadership" for efforts on the part of 
farmers to alter the agricultural policies of their governments. 
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The Political Use of Economic Inefficiency 
As part of their development programs, African governments 
intervene in markets in efforts to alter prices. At least in the 
short run market intervention establishes disequilibrium prices. 
These, in turn, generate rents. The existence of such rents has been 
analyzed by Krueger, Posner and others. The prevailing tendency has 
been to regard these rents as pure social costs � inefficiencies 
induced by the political distortion of market forces. What has not 
been stressed is that the rents also represent political resources 
resources which can be used to organize political support and to 
perpetuate government s in power. 
Such rents arise in the market s  for agricultural product s. 
Public monopsonies depress the price of commodities below the world 
market price and below the price that would prevail were competition 
permitted. To those in charge of the bureaucracy that administers the 
market accrue the non-competit ive rents. On the one hand, they can 
consume the rent themselves; corruption is a widely recognized feature 
of the operation of these agencies. On the other, they can ration 
access to these rents; they can thereby grant favors and build a 
political fol lowing. 
In this way market intervention becomes a basis for building 
political machines. Those in charge of the market can bestow the 
right of entry upon potential political loyalists; such persons will 
then come to owe their special fortunes to the favor of those in 
charge. Members of the Cocoa Marketing Board of Ghana, for example, 
frequently allowed private trading on the part of persons whose 
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political backing they wished to secure. Such persons came from the 
very highest levels of the Ghanaian government. And in Kenya tho se in 
charge of policing the coffee market conspired with the politically 
influential to evade the government mandated price for that commodity. 
In the Kenyan maize market , moreover , the issuance of movement permits 
by the director of the Maize and Produce Marketing Board was used t o ­
create an endebted and loyal political following (Kenya). Granting 
access to a market where the price of commodities has been artifically 
lowered as a matter of government policy thus becomes a valuable 
instrument in the accumulation of political influence. 
Disequilibrium product prices also facilitate political 
control by yielding the capacity to disorganiz e those mo st hurt by the 
measure:  the farmers thems elves. For a portion of the gains, the 
bureaucrat in charge of the market can turn a blind eye while farmers 
make sales at market-clearing prices. The structure of regulation 
vests legal powers in the bureaucrat s ;  the farmers have no right to 
make such sales. Only by securing an individual exception to the 
general rule can the farmer gain access to the market-clearing price. 
Within the framework established by market ing policy, the farmer s thus 
do best by securing individual exceptions. The capacity for 
discret ion therefore allows the bureaucrat to separate the individual 
interests of particular producers from the interests of their class,  
and collective organization on the part of rural producers becomes 
more difficult to organize. In addition, the structure of regulations 
creates for the government essential elements of political power. By 
al lowing exceptions to the rules, the bureaucracy grants favors ;  by 
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threatening t o  enforce the rules,  it threatens sanctions. Market 
regulations thus become a source of political control , and this, in a 
sense ,  is most true when they are in the process of being breached. 
Governments establish disequilibrium prices in the markets for 
inputs as well ; the result,  once again, is the enhancement of their 
capacity for political control. When they lower the price of inputs ,  
private sources furnish lesser quantities , users demand greater 
quantities,  and the result is excess demand. One consequence is that 
the input s acquire new value;  the administratively created shortage 
creates an economic premium for those who acquire them. Another is 
that , at the mandated price, the market can not allocate the inputs ;  
they are in short supply. Rather than being allocated through a 
pricing system, they must be rat ioned. Those in charge of the 
regulated market thereby acquire the capacity to exercise discretion 
and to confer the resources upon those whose favor they desire. 
It is these dynamics which render farm input programs so 
potent a source of political patronage. On occasion, government s 
place political ''heavy weights" in charge of these programs. The 
result often is that the elite level f igures then consume the rental 
premium ; they sell the inputs at the price they can command in the 
market. By allowing the corrupt ion of farm programs , the government s 
thus secure the fealty of potent political figur es. In other cases, 
government s forbid such corruption and instead allocate the inputs at 
their officially mandated prices. The result then is the securing of 
political loyalty from lower level political figures -- the intended 
clients and beneficiar ies of the subsidy program. For it is they who 
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then secure the rental premium. 6 Moreover , because o f  excess demand , 
those who distribute the input s can make demonstrations of political 
loyalty a prerequisite for their allocation. Thus it is that public 
programs which distribute farm credit, tractor-hire services, seeds , 
and fertilizers,  and which bestow access to government managed 
irrigation schemes and public lands,  become instruments of pol itical 
organization in the countryside of Africa. 
Regulated markets thus serve as political instruments. I 
recall an interview I held in 1 97 8  with one rich cocoa farmer in 
Ghana. I asked him why he did not try to organiz e political support 
among his colleagues for a rise in product prices. He went to his 
strongbox and produced a packet of document s :  l icenses for his 
vehicle, import permits for spare parts,  titles to his real property 
and improvement s ,  and the articles of incorporation that exempted him 
from a major portion of his income taxes. "If I tried to organize 
resistance to the government' s policies on farm price s , "  he said while 
eJCb.ibiting these documents, "I would be called an enemy of the state 
and I would lose all these. " He was a cocoa farmer and we were 
discus sing cocoa prices. The price of Ghanaian cocoa is indeed one of 
the most politically sensitive topics in African agrarian politics. 
But in systems where producers operate in markets which , on both the 
side of their outputs and on the side of their input s,  are 
increasingly maintained and controlled by public agencies , his point 
was generally valid. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper , we have examined three basic approaches to 
understanding the content of agricultural policies in Africa. One 
emphasizes the role of the state as an agency for fulfilling social 
purpo ses and interpret_& agricultural policies as choices made in 
efforts to secure public objectives. While this approach helps to 
explain some of the policies -- most notably, the burden imposed upon 
the producers of cash crops -- it nonetheless eJCb.ibits major 
weaknesses. It is particularly deficient in explaining key features 
of governmental policy toward the producers of food and in accounting 
for the ineff iciencies which characterize many features of 
agricultural programs. A second approach emphasizes the role of the 
state in aggregat ing political demands and interprets agricultural 
policies as choices made in response to the pressures of private 
interests. This approach helped to account for the systematic biases 
which characterize the structure of prices which governments attempt 
to establish in key markets,  particularly in the market for food. But 
it fails to account for other characteristic distortions and, in 
particular, for characteristic forms of economic inefficiency. The 
last approach focuses on these inefficiencies. Viewing agricultural 
programs as political resources, it looks at the ways in which 
governments attempt to use markets as instruments of political 
control. Failing to attain their social objectives ,  and indeed 
perhaps undermining them, agricultural policies nonetheless generate 
political resources by which those in charge of these programs can 
build loyal constituencies, create political followings ,  and thereby 
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remain in power. Market intervention may create inefficiency, this 
approach emphasizes,  but it may also generate the resources by which 
to govern. 
There is an important addendum to this argument. A farmer who 
exhibits political loyalty in order to secure a subsidy in one market 
despite the fact that he is taxed in another does so only because he 
is able to remove the tax. The bulk of Africa' s population consists 
of farmers. And movement s of political oppo sition in Africa 
inevitably emphasize the plight of the rural populat ion; given the 
demographics of Africa, self-interested political calculation makes 
this an inevitable result. B ecause such opposition movements are 
harassed and banned, the pattern of systematic bias which goverDment s 
instill in the markets of interest to farmers is sustained. 
The political demobilization of much of Africa plays a 
critical role in the arguments of this paper. I have emphasized the 
role of competition among interest groups rather than the role of 
political movement s seeking national majorities. And I have emphasized 
well the importance of the competition foT divisible benef its ,  
rationed favors ,  privileged access, and individual exceptions to 
general rules. These characterize the politics of self-interest as 
opposed to the politics of collective goods. The building of 
political organizations about public programs that regulate major 
markets is a form of political organiz ing that comes to dominate when 
there is little to be gained, and perhaps lives to be lost , from 
attempting to organize national political major ities. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Limitations of space prevent a fuller treatment , particularly of
the changes in the forms of intervention. In brief, these �hanges
represent a sh ift from an institutional form in which the trading 
surpluses were held "in trust" for the farmers to one in which 
they represent an overt tax. In part,  such changes took the form
of shifts in the way in which the agencies managed their funds : 
decreases over time in the effective loan rate which they charged
their goverDment s for borrowing funds,  for ex.ample, and increase.a 
in the willingness with which they transferred the funds to their
goverDment s in the form of grants. In part,  the changes took the 
form of alterations in the statutes governing the conduct of the 
boards. In Nigeria, for ex.ample, the goverDment abrogated the 
legislation which constrained it to reserve 7 0  percent of the 
surplus to stabilize prices and 7 1/ 2 percent for agr icultural
research. Similar reforms also took place in Ghana. Both changes
took place in conjunction with the launching of major development 
plans.
2. For the effects on crop pr ices of the pressures of local
industries see the following : for the palm oil industry in 
Nigeria, Kilby and Usoro; for the cocoa butter and cocoa powder 
industries in Ghana and Niger ia, Killick and Schatz; for the sugar
industry in Ghana, Killick; pineapple canning in Kenya, Swainson; 
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the INDECO cannery in Zambia, Baylies; the textile industry in 
Ivory Coast, Campbell; vegetable oil industry in Sudan, African 
Business (February 1 9 80); and coffee roasting firms in Tanzania. 
3. The Maize and Produce Board of Kenya was in fact established to do 
the oppo site : to control marketing so as to enable the local
price to lie above the world price. But in recent years the Board 
has acted to restrain price increases.
The adoption of hybrid seeds in the late 1 970s led to 
rapid increases in maize supplies and to a fall in maize prices. 
With a glut market , the Board was both unable and unwilling to 
restrict the marketing of maize. Recent food shortages in Kenya 
have led to strong criticisms of maize exports and the Board is 
now being pressed to expedite imports so as to reduce the price of 
maize. Under conditions of rising prices,  moreover , it is again 
attempting to regulate internal marketing. The Board has thus 
been recast as an instrument for lowering rather than increasing 
farm prices. For a summary of Parliamentary debates in Kenya 
concerning the role of the Board, see The Weekly Review, July 4, 
1 9 80. 
it. In many credit programs , the col lection rate for large farmers is 
often lower than that for small scale producer s ;  the latter in 
effect subsidize the interest rate offered to the former. In 
Tanzania, the subsidy for fertilizer is paid from the earnings of 
the government monopsony ; as the levies are raised from all 
� 
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farmers and fertilizer employed disproportionately by the more 
"advanced, " the subsidy program represents a transfer from small 
to large farmer s. When cooperative societies serve as the 
marketing channels for produce and for inputs ,  studies have shown 
that, once again, it is the larger farmers who secure the bulk of 
the input s distributed by the societies; but the deductions from 
crop sales that finance these services are imposed on all farmers. 
Once again the result is a redistribution of income. 
The assumption that people specialize in production and generalize 
in consumption generates one further assumption that is critical 
to the results of this model : that people petition for price 
rises in the goods they make but do not petition against the price 
rises demanded by others. Given out initial assumption, people 
will be more affected by a rise in the price of the commodity they 
make than by a change in the price of any coaanodity which they 
consume; and given limited resources with which to lobby , they can 
better increase their real income by seeking increases in the 
price of their product s than by opposing the price increases 
sought by others. 
That demands for , rather than against , price increases 
dominate lobbying efforts is well-documented in Schatt schneider' s 
classic study of tariff making in the United States. It was also 
confirmed in my interviews with members of the Price and Income 
Board in Ghana; they emphasized that "opposition" to others' price 
increases took the form of demands for off setting increases in the 
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prices of their own commodities. 
T he critical role of the assumption that people lobby for 
but not against price increases can be seen in the fact that 
without it people outside the "winning" coalition could "vote" 
against the allocation proposed by that coalition and the winning 
coalition could not form; there would be no natural tendency for 
the "least cost" coalition -- i. e. the coalition of persons with 
the lowest " a ' s" - to form. This possibility in fact realized 
in many legislative settings where all persons vote and where they 
can vote for or against any proposal. As many legislation 
programs generate benefits for particular constituencies which are 
paid for by all constituencies, they generate political dynamics
very similar to those studied here; but because those hurt by 
these programs can vote against them, such "least cost, " minimal 
winning coalitions do not form. Rather, programs tend to become 
" logrolled. " 
6. In Zambia, one of the cooperative societies which I studied in 
Luapula purchased the subsidized fertilizers. It then reaped the 
rental premium associated with the subsidy by selling the 
fertilizer at market-clearing prices to the local commercial
farmers. 
42 
REFERENCES 
Bates, Robert H. and William P. Rogerson. Forthcoming. "Agriculture 
in Development: A Coalitional Analysis. " Public Choice. 
Baylies, Carolyn. 1 97 8. "The State and Class Formation in Zambia. " 2 
Vols. Ph. D • •  Dissertation, University of Michigan. 
Campbell, Bonnie. 197 4. "The Social, Political and Economic 
Consequences of French Private I nvestment in the Ivory Coast, 
1960-1970. A Case Study of Cotton and Textile Production. " 
Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Sussex. 
Cohen, John and Weintraub, Dov. 1 97 5, Land and Peasants in Imperial 
Ethiopia: The Social Background to Revolution. Assen: Van 
Gorcum. 
Cruise O' Brien, Donal B. 1971. T he Mourides of Senegal: The 
Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Dadson, John Alfred. 1 970. " Socialized Agriculture in Ghana, 1962-
196 5. 11 Ph. D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, Harvard 
University. 
43 
Ekhomu, David Onaburekhale. 197 8. "National Food Policies and 
Bureaucracies in Nigeria : Legitimation, Implementation, and 
Evaluation. " Paper presented at the African Studies 
Association Convention, Baltimore ,  Maryland. Mimeographed. 
Gotsch, Carl and Gilbert Brown. l 9 1ll. "Prices ,  Taxes and Subsidies 
in Pakistan Agr iculture, 1 960-1 97 6. " World Bank Staff Working 
Paper No. 3 fil .  Washington, D. C. : The World Bank. 
Ghana. 1956. Report of the CollDiliss ion of Enquiry into the Affairs of 
the Cocoa Purchasing Company (Jibowu CollDilission). 
1 967.  Report of the CollDilission of Enquiry into the Local 
Purchas ing of Cocoa. 
Griffin, Keith. 1972.  The Green Revolution: An Economic Analys is. 
Geneva : United Nations Research Institute. 
Hayami, Yuj iro. 197 5. "Japan' s Rice Policy in Historical 
Perspective. " Food Research Studies 1 4,  no. 4: 3 59-3 Ill. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 1 97 5. Kenya : 
Into the Second Decade, 
1 97 8a. Ivory Coas t :  The Challenge of Success. 
International Labor Organization. 1 97 5. Growth, Employment and 
Equity: A Comprehensive Strategy for Sudan. 
Kaneda, Hiromitsu and Johnston, Bruce F. 1961. "Urban Food 
Expenditure Patterns in Tropical Africa. " Food Research 
Institute Studies 2, no. 3 : 22 9-27 5. 
44 
Kenya. 1 966. Report of the Maize CollDilission of Inquiry, June 1966. 
Kilby, Peter. 196 9. Industrializat ion in an Open Economy: Nigeria 
1945-1966. Cambr idge : The University Press. 
Killick, Tony. 1 97 8. Development Economics in Action. New York: St. 
Martin' s Press. 
Krishna, Raj. 1967.  "Agricultural Price Policy and Economic 
Development. " In Agricultural Development and Economic 
Growth . edited by Herman M. Southworth and Bruce F. Johnston 
Ithaca : Cornell University Press. 
Kline, c. K. ; Green, D. A. G. ; Donahue ,  Roy L. ; and Stout , B.A. 1 96 9. 
Agricultural Mechanizat ion in Equatorial Africa. East 
Lansing : Michigan State University. 
Krueger • Anne O. 1 97 4. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking 
Society. " American Economic Review 6 4, no. 3 : 2 91-303. 
45 
Leonard, David K. 1 97 7 .  Reaching the Peasant Farmer : Organizat ion 
Theory and Practice in Kenya. Chicago and London : University 
of Chicago Press. 
Lipton, Michael. 1 977.  Why Poor People Stay Poor : Urban Bias in 
World Development. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University 
Press. 
Njono, Apollo I. 1 97 7 .  "The Africanisation of the 'White Highlands' : 
A S tudy in Agrarian Class S truggles in Kenya, 1 9 50-1 97 4. "  
Ph. D. Dis sertation, Princeton University. 
Pearson, S cott R. ; Nelson, Gerald C. ; and S tryker , J, Dirck. 1 97 6. 
"Incentives and Comparative Advantage in Ghanaian Industry and 
Agriculture. " Paper for the West African Regional Proj ect. 
Mimeographed. 
Posner, Richard A. 1 97 S. "The S ocial Costs of Monopoly and 
Regulation. " Journal of Political Economy 83 ,  no. 4: f!IJ7-827. 
S chatz , S ayre P. 1 977.  Nigerian Capitalism. Berkeley , Los Angeles 
and London : University of California Press. 
S chattschneider , E. B. 1 97 4. Politics, Pressures and the Tar iff, 
New York : Arno Press. 
46 
Schultz, Theodore W. 1 976.  Transforming Traditional Agriculture, 
New York : Arno Press. 
������• ed. 1 97 8. Distort ion of Agricultural Incentives. 
Bloomington, Indiana : Indiana University Press. 
S tryker , J. Dirck. 1 97 5. "Ghana Agriculture. " Paper for the West 
African Regional Project. Mimeographed. 
Swainson, Nicola. 1 977.  Foreign Corporations and Economic Growth in 
Kenya. Manuscript. 
Tanzania. Ministry of Agriculture. 1 977.  Price Policy 
Reconnnendations for the 1 97 8/1 97 9  Agricultural Price Review 
Annex 10� Coffee. Mimeographed. 
Temu, Peter E. 1 97 5. "Marketing Board Pricing and S torage Policy 
with Particular Reference to Maize in Tanzania. 11 Ph. D. 
Dissertation, Stanford University. 
Unit ed S tates. General Accounting Office. 1 97 5. Disincentives to 
Agricultural Production in Developing Countries. Washington, 
D. C. 
United S tates. United S tates Agency for International Development. 
1 97 5. Development Assistance Program FY 1 976-FY 1 9f!IJ. Ghana 
47 
Vol 4, Annex D -- Agric ultural Sector. 
Usoro, Eno J. 1 97 4. The Nigerian Palm Oil Industry. Ibadan: Ibadan 
University Press. 
Van Velzen, H. U. E. 1973 . " Staff, Kul aks and Peasants. "  In 
Socialism in Afric a, edited by Lionel Cliffe and John Saul 
Vol. 2 .  Dar es Salaam : East Afric an Publishing House. 1973 . 
Wells, J erome C. 1974. Agricultural Policy and Ec onomic Growth in 
Nigeria, 1962-68 . Ibadan: Oxford University Press for the 
Nigerian Institute of Social and Ec onomic Researc h. 
APPENDIX 
The <following tables suggest the extent to which farmers 
receive the value of the crops which they produce for export . For 
a series of crops , the tables report the percent of the sales 
realization which the farmers actually receive.  They also list 
the sources from wh ich the information was taken . 
In some cases , which I have marked ' p ; ' the measure 
is based on prices . It is the ratio of the price received by the 
producer to the price that prevailed on the world market . In each 
instance ,  I have used sources which employed the f . o .b .  price at the 
maj or nat ional port as a measure of the world price . In other 
cas es ,  which I have market ' i , '  the measure is calculated in terms 
of incomes . It is then the ratio of the total value of the farmers ' 
earnings from the sale of the crop to the reported total value 
realized from the sale of the crop on the international market .  
CROP . COUNTRY YEAR 
PERCENT OF 
SALES REALIZATION (a) SOURCE 
Cotton Kenya 1970-1971 82 ( i) Clive S .  Gray , 1977  
1971-1972  66 ( i) II II  II 
197 5-1976 48  (i)  II II II  
Sudan 1961-1962 44 (i) ILO/UNDP , 1976 
1971-197 2 49 ( i) II II  
Nigeria 1950-1951 16 (p) Onitiri-Olatunboaun,1974 
1951-1952 17 (p) II  II  I I  
1952-1953 16 (p) II II  II 
1953-1954 17  (p) I I  II  II  
1954-1955 20 (p) II II  II  
1955-1956 20 (p) I I  I I  I I  
1956-1957 20 (p) I I  I I  II  
1957-1958 22 (p) I I  I I  II 
(a) (i) Percent of income from the sale of crop obtained by producer , 
(p} Price paid to producer as percent of international (f , o . b . ) price . :r 
(b) No international sales o f  cotton . "' 
PERCENT OF
CROP ' COUNTRY YEAR SALES REALIZATION (a) SOURCE 
Cotton Nigeria 1958-1959 24 (p) Onitiri-Olatunbosun, 1974 
1959-1960 28 (p) II  II  II 
1960-1961 25 (p) I I  II  II  
1961-1962 20 (p) I I  II  II 
1962-1963 18 (p) I I  II  II 
1963-1964 19 (p) II  II II  
1964-1965 2 1  (p) IBRD, 19 78 
1965-1966 21 (p) II  II  
1966-1967 23 (p) I I  I I  
1967-1968 24 (p) I I  I I  
1968-1969 27 (p) II  II 
1969-1970 32 (p) I I  I I  
1970-1971 36 (p) I I  I I  
1971-1972  4 6  (p) II  I I  
197 2-197 3 43  (p)  II I I  
1973-1974 - (b) II II 
1974-1975 - (b) II I I  
1975-197 6 - (b) II II 
1976-1977 95 (p) II  II 
:r 
w 
PERCENT OF 
CROP COUNTRY YEAR SALES REALIZATION SOURCE 
Cotton Tanzania 1966-1967 65 (p)  - Republic of Tanzania , 1976 
1967-1968 5 8  (p)  " " " II 
1968-1969 5 9  (p)  " II " " 
1969-1970 7 1  (p)  II II II II 
1970-1971 64 (p)  II II " II 
1971-1972 5 4  (p)  I I  II II II 
1972-1973 55 (p)  " II II  II 
1973-1974 36 (p)  II II II II  
1974-1975 41 (p)  II II II II  
Uganda 1954 70 (i)  Vali Jamal , 1976 
1955 75 (i)  II II  II 
1956 77 (i) I I  II II 
1957 76 (i) II II II 
1958 100 (i)  I I  I I  II 
1959 10 1 (i)  II II II 
1960 75 (i) II  " II 
1954-19 60 80 (i)  I I  I I  I I  
� 
"" 
PERCENT OF 
CROP COUNTRY YEAR SALES REALIZATION 
(a) SOURCE 
Cocoa Nigeria 1947-1948 65 (p) Onitiri-Olatunbosun , 1974 
1948-1949 61 (p) 
I I  I I  I I  
1949-1950 7 1  (p)  
I I  II II 
1950-1951 63 (p) 
II II II 
1951-1952 66 (p) 
I I  I I  " 
1952-1953 68 (p)  
t i  I I  ti  
1953-1954 70 (p) 
I I  I I  II 
1954-1955 49 (p)  
II II II 
1955-1956 66 (p) 
ti  II ti 
1956-1957 71 (p) 
II II II 
1957-1958 7 6  (p)  
II II II 
1958-1959 48 (p) 
ti  II  ti  
1959-1960 58 (p) 
I I  I I  I I  
1960-1961 62 (p) 
I I  I I  I I  
1961-1962 52 (p)  
I I  II II 
1962-196 3 59 (p)  
II II " 
1963-1964 57 (p)  
II II " 
1964-1965 89 (p) 
II  II  II  
1965-1966 51 (p) 
II  II II 
1966-1967 45 (p)  
I I  II II 
1967-1968 43 (p)  
II II II 
1968-1969 38 (p) 
I I  I I  I I  
)> 
I 
Vl 
(a) see note on cotton .  
CROP COUNTRY YEAR 
Cocoa Nigeria 1964-196S 
196S-1966 
1966-1967 
1967-1968 
1968-1969 
1969-1970 
197 0-197 1 
1971-1972 
1972-1973 
1973-1974 
1974-197S 
197S-1976 
1976-1977 
(a) see note on cotton . 
CROP COUNTRY YEAR 
Cocoa Ghana 1947 
1948 
1949 
19SO 
19Sl 
19S2 
19S3 
19S4 
19SS 
19S6 
19S7 
19SB 
19S9 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1962-1963 
1963-1964 
1964-1965 
(a) see note on cotton. 
rC.l\.\,,C.l, 1 V I"  ( ) 
SALES REALIZATION 
a 
89 (p) 
39 (p) 
46 (p) 
38 (p) 
34 (p) 
4 S  ( p )  
so (p) 
62 (p) 
SB (p) 
so (p) 
63 (p) 
7 2  (p) 
66 (p) 
PERCENT OF 
SALES REALIZATION 
S6 (p) 
38 (p) 
89 (p) 
4 1  (p) 
49 (p) 
61 (p) 
S S  (p) 
34 (p) 
40 (p) 
67 (p) 
7 4  (p)  
4 2  (p)  
48 (p) 
51 (p) 
66 (p) 
65 (p) 
62 (p) 
S7 (p) 
60 (p) 
SOURCE 
IBRD, 1978
" " 
" " 
" " 
II II 
II II 
II II 
II " 
II " 
II " 
" " 
II " 
II II 
:r 
°' 
SOURCE· 
Bateman , 196S
II II 
II II 
II II 
II II 
II II  
II II 
II II 
II II 
II II 
II II 
II II 
II II 
II II 
II II 
II II 
Beckman , 1976
I I  I I  
I I  I I  
:r 
" 
CROP COUNTRY YEAR SALES REALIZATION , _ ,  
Cocoa Ghana 1947-1948 37 ( i) 
1948-1949 90 ( i) 
1949-1950 46 ( i) 
1950-1951 49 ( i) 
1951-1952 6 1  ( i) 
1952-1953 56 ( i) 
1953-1954 38 ( i) 
1954-1955 38 ( i) 
1955-1956 65 ( i) 
1956-1957 78 ( i) 
1957-1958 44 ( i) 
1958-1959 41!1 ( i) 
1959-1960 51 ( i) 
1960-1961 68 ( i) 
1961-1962 60 (i) 
1962-1963 62 (i) 
1963-1964 55 (i)  
(a) see note on cotton . 
CROP COUNTRY YEAR 
PERCENT OF 
SALES REALIZATION 
Coffee ltenya; 1970-1971 63 (p) Smallholders 
1971-1972 62 (p) 
1972-197 3 62 (p) 
1973-1974 61 (p) 
1974-1975 63 (p) 
1975-1976 64 (p) 
Kenya , Estates 19 70-19 71 92 ( p) 
19 7 1-19 7 2  9 1  (p) 
19 72-19 7 3  9 0  ( p )  
19 7 3-19 74 90 (p) 
19 74-19 75 9 3  (p) 
19 75-19 76 9 3  ( p) 
Tanzania(b) 1971-1972 75 (p) 
1972-1973 69 (p) 
1973-1974 57 (p) 
1974-1975 66 (p) 
1975-1976 58 (p) 
1976-1977 46 (p) 
(b) Price paid to small-holders as percent o f  auction price ; mild Arabica . 
SOURCE 
Beckman , 1976 
" " 
" " 
II II 
" " 
II " 
II II 
II II 
II " 
II " 
II II 
II " 
II II 
II II 
II " 
II " 
" " 
:i-
CD 
SOURCE 
Internat ional Coffee Organ . 1977 
" II " " 
" II II " 
II II II II 
II II II II 
II " " " 
II " " " 
" " " " 
" " " " 
" " II " 
II " II " 
" II " II 
II II II II 
II II II II  
" " II II 
II  II  II " 
II II II II 
Republ ic of Tanzania ,  1977 
:i-\0 
CROP COUNTRY 
Co ffee Uganda .  
CROP 
Pyrethreum 
Wattle Bark 
(a) see note on cotton 
. COUNTRY 
Kenya 
Kenya 
YEAR 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1954-1960 
YEAR 
1970-1971 
1971-1972 
1972-197 3 
1973-1974 
1974-1975 
1975-1976 
1970-1971 
1971-1972 
1972-1973 
197 3-197 4 
1974-1975 
1975-1976 
PERCENT OF 
SALES REALIZATION 
7 6  (i) 
116 (i)  
81 (i) 
77 (i) 
7 2  ( i )  
8 6  (i) 
127 (i) 
90 (i) 
PERCENT OF 
SALES REALIZATION (a) 
7 5  (i) 
7 0  (i)  
6 7  (i)  
62 (i) 
7 7  (i)  
6 6  (i)  
39 (i) 
38 (i) 
35 (i) 
33 (i) 
28 (i) 
28 ( i) 
SOURCE 
Vali Jamal , 1976 
II  II  II 
II  II  II  
II II II 
II  II  II  
,,  II II  
" II II 
II I I  I I  
SOURCE 
Clive S .  Gray , 1977 
II  II  II  
II  II  II  
II  II  II  
I I  II  II  
II  I I  II  
Clive S, Gray , 197 7 
II II II 
II II II 
II II II 
II I I  II  
II II  II  
:r 
I-' 0 
:r 
I-' 
I-' 
PERCENT OF 
CROP · COUNTRY YEAR SALES REALIZATION SOURCE 
Groundnuts Nigeria 1947-1948 64 (p) Onitiri-Olatunbosun , 197 4 
1948-1949 48 (p) II II II  
1949-1950 42 (p)  II II II 
1950-1951 44 (p) II  II II  
1951-1952 55 (p ) II II II  
1952-1953 42 (p) I I  I I  II  
1953-1954 48 (p)  II II II  
1954-1955 51 (p)  II II II  
1955-1956 61 (p) II  II II 
1956-1957 52 (p) II II II  
1957-1958 56 (p) I I  I I  I I  
1958-1959 65 (p) I I  II II 
1959-1960 66 (p) I I  I I  I I  
1960-1961 54 (p) II II II 
1961-1962 58 (p) II II II 
1962-1963 51 (p) I I  I I  I I  
1963-1964 48 (p) II II II 
1964-19 6 5  48 (p) IBRD ,  19 7 8  
1965-1966 47 (p) II II 
1966-1967 50 (p) II II 
1967-1968 46 (p) II II 
1968-1969 41 (p) II II 
1969-1970 40 (p) I I  I I  =r 
..... 
"' 
PERCENT OF 
CROP . COUNTRY YEAR SALES REALIZATION SOURCE 
Groundnuts Nigeria 197 0-197 1  3 7  (p) IBRD , 1978 
1 9 7 1-1972 3 7  (p) II II 
197 2-1973 35 (p) I I  I I  
197 3-1974 42 (p) II  II  
1974-1975 50 (p) II II 
197 5-19 7 6  83 (p)  II II 
197 6-1977 1 2 0  (p)  II II 
Senegal 196 2-19 6 3  4 5  ( p) IBRD , 19 74 
196 3-19 64 45 (p) II II  
1964-1965 45 (p) II  II 
II  II  
1965-1966 48 ( p) 
II II 
1966-19 67 46 ( p) 
II II  
19 67-19 6 8  4 7  ( p) 
1968- 1969 46 (p) II  II 
1969-19 70 36 ( p) II II 
19 70-19 7 1  3 2  ( p) II II 
19 71-19 7 2  40 (p) II  II 
19 72-19 7 3  30 ( p) II II  
1962-19 6 3  6 5  ( i)  I I  I I  
196 3-1964 6 5  ( i) II  II  
1964-19 65 65 (i )  I I  I I  
19 65-1966 69 ( i) II  II  > I 
..... 
w 
PERCENT OF 
CROP COUNTRY YEAR SALES REALIZATION ( a) SOURCE 
Groundnuts Senegal 1966-1967  67  ( i) IBRD , 19 74 
196 7-1968 6 7  ( i) II II 
1968-1969 66 ( i) II II 
1969-19 70 5 2  (i) II II 
19 70-19 71 46 ( i) II I I  
19 7 1- 19 72 5 7  ( i) II II 
1972-19 73 43 ( i) II II 
::-
I-' 
� 
PERCENT OF 
CROP ' COUNTRY YEAR SALES REALIZATION (
a) 
SOURCE 
Palm Oil Nigeria 1947-1948 38 (p) Onitiri-Olatunboeun , 1974 
1948-1949 54 (p) I I  II  II  
1949-1950 61 (p) II  II  " 
1950-1951 61 {p)  " II " 
1951-1952 64 (p) II  II  " 
1952-1953 60 {p) II  II  II  
1953-1954 117 {p)  I I  I I  I I  
1954-1955 87 (p) II II  I I  
1955-1956 81 (p) II  II  II  
1956-1957 62 (p) II II  II  
1957-1958 60 (p) I I  II  II  
1958-1959 67 (p) I I  II  II  
1959-1960 57 (p) II  II  II 
1960-1961 63 (p) II  II  II 
1961-1962 59 (p) II  I I  II  
1962-1963 53 (p) II  " II 
1963-1964 54 (p) II " II 
1964-1965 48 ( p) IBRD , 1978 
1965-1966 45 (p) II  II  
1966-1967 54 (p) II  II  
1967-1968 55 (p) II  I I  
1968-1969 91 (p) I I  II  
1969-1970 91 (p) II  II  ::-
I-' 
V1 
CROP COUNTRY 
Palm Oil Nigeria 
(a) Same no te as in cotton . 
(b ) Foreign exports ceased . 
CROP ' COUNTRY 
Palm Kernel Niger ia 
YEAR 
1970-1971 
1971-197 2 
197 2-1973 
1973-1974 
1974-197 5 
1975-1976 
1976-1977 
YEAR 
1947-1948 
1948-1949 
1 949-1950 
1950-1951 
1951- 1952 
1952-1953 
1953-1954 
1954-1955 
1955-1956 
1956-1957 
1957-1958 
1958-1959 
1 959-1960 
1960-1961 
1961-1962 
1962-1963 
1963-1964 
1964-1965 
1965-1966 
1966-1967 
1967-1968 
1968-1969 
1969-1970 
PERCENT OF 
SALES REALIZATION (a) 
49 (p)  
56 (p) 
- (b) 
- (b) 
- (b) 
- (b) 
- ( b) 
PERCENT OF 
SALES REALIZATION (
b) 
36 (p) 
60 (p) 
58 (p) 
64 (p) 
55 (p) 
59 (p) 
62 (p) 
69 (p) 
68 (p) 
66 (p) 
68 (p) 
63 (p) 
48  (p)  
4 7  (p) 
60 (p) 
54 (p) 
48 (p) 
46  ( p) 
4 5  (p)
51 (p) 
48 (p) 
45  (p)  
51 (p) 
SOURCE 
IBRD , 197 8 
" II 
" II 
II II  
" II 
II II 
II II 
�
I-' "' 
SOURCE 
Onit iri-Olatunbosun , 1974 
" I I  II  
" II " 
" II " 
" " " 
II II " 
" " " 
II II " 
II " " 
II II " 
II II II  
II  II  " 
II II II 
" II II 
II II  II  
II II  II 
II  II  " 
IBRD, 1978 
" II 
" II 
II II 
II  II  
II  II  �
I-' ...., 
PERCENT OF 
CROP COUNTRY YEAR SALES REALIZATION (b) 
Palm Kernel Nigeria 1970-1971 52 (p) 
1971- 197 2 74 (p) 
1972-1973 41 
(p) 
1973-1974 40 (p) 
1974-1975 52 
(p) 
197 5-1976 1 50 (p) 
197 6-1977 130 
(p) 
SOURCE 
IBRD, 1978 
I I  II  
II  II  
ti  II  
ti  II  
II  II  
II  II  
::-
� 
ea 
